Europe's Banks, Europe's Crisis. CEPS Commentaries, 8 July 2010 by Gros, Daniel.
  
Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. An earlier version of 
this Commentary was disseminated to newspapers worldwide by Project Syndicate. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. The 
views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with 
which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2010 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 ▪ http://www.ceps.eu 
Europe’s Banks, Europe’s Crisis  
Daniel Gros 
8 July 2010 
urope continues to occupy centre stage of Act II of the global financial crisis, which has now 
mutated into a sovereign-debt crisis within the eurozone. How could this happen when, at least 
on paper, all problems had seemingly been resolved during May’s extraordinary EU summit 
meeting, which created a European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and ensured total funding 
of close to $1 trillion? 
The promises made in early May have, in the meantime, been made more concrete. A ‘special purpose 
vehicle’ (SPV) has been established in Luxembourg, and can already count on hundreds of billions of 
euros in guarantees from member states.  
If all the resources promised (€750 billion, including financing from the International Monetary Fund) 
were to be used in full, the EU could completely refinance all distressed countries (Portugal, Spain and 
Ireland) for a couple of years. Moreover, the European Central Bank has shown a willingness to buy 
government (and private) bonds if it deems that the functioning of the market has been impaired. 
But this official financial firepower has left markets unimpressed. Spreads on Spanish government 
bonds continue to creep up, and are now higher than before the announcement of the EFSF. And there 
are ominous signs of tension in the interbank market, as more and more banks would rather deposit their 
money at the ECB than lend to other banks, which shows that confidence in the stability of the system 
has not been restored. 
The explanation for these lingering doubts is simple: the problems that underlie the crisis (the precarious 
state of Greek public finances and that of the Spanish real estate sector) have not been solved, despite 
the fact that they should be easily manageable in a pan-European context. Greece represents only about 
2% of the eurozone economy; even if it defaulted on its public debt, and the recovery value were only 
50%, the losses would be about €150 billion, or just 1.5% of eurozone GDP. 
Although the problems in Spain are likely to be somewhat larger, official estimates of the losses in the 
Spanish banking system amount to only €100 billion. But the real problem in Spain might well lie 
elsewhere: the exposure of French, German and other banks to Spain’s real-estate sector. Many loans to 
Spanish developers will have to be written off. But, even in the worst case scenario, the combined losses 
of Spanish and other banks in the Spanish real-estate sector should not exceed €300 billion, or about 3% 
of EU GDP. 
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So, the real question is: why are problems of manageable proportion on Europe’s periphery paralysing 
the eurozone’s entire banking system? After all, one would not expect the United States’ banking 
system to collapse just because there was a housing bubble in California and the state of Michigan 
(similar in size to Greece) became insolvent. 
A key reason why Europe’s financial markets remain nervous is that, officially, there is no problem. 
Officially, Greece does not have a solvency problem, and the restructuring of its public debt is not an 
option. Similarly, in Spain the official line is that the domestic banking sector is well capitalised. 
When dealing with financial-market turbulence, the first rule should be to acknowledge the truth and 
scale of the problems at hand. Greece’s experience has shown that pretending that problems do not exist 
can result in a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing risk premia and declining confidence. 
In this respect, the publication of the results of ‘stress tests’ conducted on the EU’s 100 largest banks, 
promised for the end of July, is a clear step forward. 
But there is a second and more disturbing reason why financial markets remain unsettled: large swathes 
of the European banking system remain vastly undercapitalised. According to ECB statistics, eurozone 
banks have about €20 of liabilities (including interbank debt) for every euro of capital and reserves. This 
implies that for every capital loss of one euro lurking in some bank, there will be about €20 of doubtful 
debt. 
Even a worst-case scenario for Greece and Spain would imply losses of €450 billion at most. The funds 
mobilised so far under the EFSF (€750 billion) would be amply sufficient to deal with all of this – 
provided that these potential losses are clearly identified and the necessary funds are earmarked to deal 
with them. Yet this is not the approach that is being followed. 
Instead, European funding will be used only to bail out governments, which in turn need the money to 
bail out their banks. But, given the 20:1 liability-capital ratio in the banking sector, this approach 
implies that the funding requirements will become astronomical: compared to a bill of €450 billion, the 
sum of €9 trillion in debt guarantees would be needed to ensure the stability of the eurozone’s banking 
system if potential losses remain undisclosed and dispersed. 
In short, rigorous stress testing of eurozone banks (followed by mandatory recapitalisation) would 
require much less public funding than would a policy of continuing to extend blanket guarantees to 
everybody. 
Europe cannot escape the crisis in its financial markets until it fixes its banks. Unfortunately, Europe’s 
policy-makers have twice let themselves be misled by politically convenient views of the crisis – first in 
2007-08, by supposing that the financial contagion came from the US, and nowadays, by blaming 
reckless fiscal policy in the southern eurozone. 
But the real problem is that the EU’s banking system is so weakly capitalised that it cannot take any 
losses, while also being so interconnected that problems in one country quickly put the entire system at 
risk. Until the banks’ balance-sheet problems are dealt with decisively, financial markets will remain on 
edge. 
 
